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I too lack sympathy for metaphysics,
though not in general: only for
pre-Kantian metaphysics—and then
only if practised after Kant.
van Fraassen
1 Introduction
Let me begin with a conceit—unworthy of Bas, granted, but intended as a tribute
nonetheless.
***
An excerpt from a grant proposal of the distant future. There has recently been a revival
of interest in the so-called Jersey school of metaphysicians. The members of this school
flourished long ago of course, in the tumultuous period immediately preceding the
biochemical amalgamation of the Bush and Clinton dynasties. Yet their views and
arguments remain of contemporary interest.
Recent literature on the Jersey metaphysicians has provided a portrait of the move-
ment in broad brushstrokes, emphasising the substantial body of doctrinal agreement
within the school, with a special focus on their peculiarly rabid form of transcendental
idealism. I aim to fill in some of the details in this portrait, by exploring some of the dif-
ferences of detail between the views of the two influential early Jersey metaphysicians,
David Lewis and Bas van Fraassen.1
Gordon Belot
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1 Although all undergraduates today associate these philosophers with the doctrines known
as Lewis’s Beard and van Fraassen’s beard (the one so much easier to grasp than the other!),
there is little reason to think that either actually espoused the doctrine now associated asso-
ciated with his name.
2It is clear from the doxography that during the period in question Kant was the
dominant figure of study in Jersey.2 What set Lewis and van Fraassen apart from some
of their contemporaries was their shared focus on the metaphysics of transcendental
idealism. As one can learn from any textbook today, each of these authors built his
system around the thesis that the fundamental structure of the world, as discoverable
through experience and science, is not objective but has a certain relativity to cognitive
agents.
I have explored Lewis’s Kantianism in previous work. At least two of Lewis’s cen-
tral doctrines are Kantian in provenance. According to the first, due to the nature of
the principle of individuation of properties the reach of science is limited and cannot
provide us with knowledge of the intrinsic nature of things-in-themselves (Lewis 2009,
Langton 2004). According to the second—which provides a clear example of transcen-
dental idealism in our sense—the causal structure of the world is not absolute but
rather depends on our cognitive constitution: the causal relations of our world are
determined by which counterfactual statements are true (Lewis 1986a); which counter-
factual statements are true depends on the laws of nature (Lewis 1986b); and the laws
of nature depend on our cognitive capacities (Lewis 1986c, Appendix C).3
In my future work I intend to explore the transcendental idealism of van Fraassen,
by focussing on two of his works: an early work on the philosophy of space and time (van
Fraassen 1970); and a work of his middle period concerned with scientific representation
(van Fraassen 2008).4 My preliminary studies suggest the following picture. In the early
work, van Fraassen espouses a variety of transcendental idealism according to which
the structures of space and time are relative to our scientific beliefs, so that there is
a sense in which reality, in abstraction from the beliefs of agents, has no spatial or
temporal structure—in particular, the question of “correctness” of a theory about the
structure of space and time does not arise. The discussion of transcendental idealism
in the later work is, curiously, not nearly so explicit. But many of the elements of the
earlier work seem to still be in place. So it would appear that for van Fraassen of the
middle period, the early work erred only in not stressing that the basic structure of
the argument was extremely general, and did not depend on any special feature of the
philosophical problems of space and time. If all of this is correct, then an interesting
picture emerges, on which van Fraassen’s transcendental idealism differed in important
ways from that of Lewis—and was, if anything, an even more bold piece of metaphysics.
***
2 Note that recent scholarship has called into question the traditional attribution of the
panegyric “Kant u¨ber alles” to Harman pe`re.
3 Permit me an observation that will illustrate the caprice of the processes of history by which
writings from that period were transmitted to us. We know that van Fraassen advanced an
account of the nature of science upon which this aim was relative to human perceptual capac-
ities. We know that his contemporaries found this view curiously difficult to accept and often
asked him to explain how this account was compatible with the fact that human perceptual
capacities might change, through technology or through redrawing of the human/nonhuman
boundary. Surely Lewis’s more radical position was met with the same sort of Boetian uproar.
Yet no trace of this remains in the works that have come down to us. Equally curious: of the
two Lewisian theses just mentioned, only the first is characterised as Kantian in the extant
literature of that time.
4 I aim eventually to develop the sort of expertise in the history of trapeze and of long-
vanished varieties of wine and cheese that would allow me to grapple with van Fraassen’s
notoriously intricate late works. Unfortunately this will not be feasible in the temporal frame-
work of the present project.
3Well, that is more than enough of that. But I hope my intentions are clear at any
rate. In the preface to his sparkling recent book, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes
of Perspective (van Fraassen 2008, henceforth ‘SR’), van Fraassen intimates that neo-
Kantian themes will be evident throughout the book. And they are, especially in his
discussion of the problem of coordination (Chapter 5) and of the prospects for empiricist
structuralism (Chapter 11). But I want to use this occasion to press van Fraassen to
make these themes more evident still.
In particular, I would like to understand better the relation between the views de-
veloped in the new book, and those developed in his book on the philosophy of space
and time: the notion of a logical space appears to play a similar (and similarly promi-
nent) role in both works—and in the older book this notion was intimately bound up
with the striking anti-realism about spatial and temporal structure that van Fraassen
then espoused. Further, I would like to understand whether new work can be read as
a contribution to metaphysics, rather than a recusal from it.
In the final section of the paper I pose some questions for van Fraassen. The inter-
vening sections provide context and motivation.
2 Good-Cop, Bad-Cop
In some moods, van Fraassen evinces a tolerant attitude towards the sort of ontological
investigations that are at the centre of so much of contemporary metaphysics and
philosophy of physics. In a recent discussion, he characterises the project of interpreting
physical theories in the following terms.
The enterprise of interpretation, its flagships being twentieth century interpre-
tations of relativity theory and quantum mechanics, is not a pursuit of truth.
The nearest I can say is that it pursues a sense of understanding in which
the question of truth is bracketed, in order to give us a handle on the concep-
tual structure of a theory, seen from various perspectives, and to give us some
assurance of its coherence (van Fraassen 2007, p. 358).5
Jauernig suggests to van Fraassen that we should think of metaphysics as having a
corresponding role:
to provide theories that complement our scientific theories about the world
and the human condition in order to arrive at a more complete story . . . . These
metaphysical theories are not presented as true but as metaphysically adequate,
that is, as possible and explanatorily or intellectually satisfying. . . . [I]sn’t it
plausible to say that understanding the world and the human condition involves
knowing the possible ways the world could be with respect to those aspects or
domains that cannot in principle be empirically investigated, and which are,
thus, inaccessible to the empirical sciences? (Jauernig 2007, pp. 315 f.)
Responding to Jauernig, van Fraassen suggests that his own preferred account of meta-
physics differs from hers only in tone (van Fraassen 2007, §5). Presumably, for this
tolerant van Fraassen, the only general complaint to be made against metaphysics as
currently practised is an accusation of false consciousness—too many metaphysicians
believe falsely that the aim of their field is to produce true theories. But there is a
5 See also (van Fraassen 1989, §9.4) and (van Fraassen 1991, §§1.1, 1.3, 8.1, and 12.5).
4sense in which this is a minor criticism: for on van Fraassen’s view many scientists
labour under an analogous misapprehension—but that fact does little to detract from
the glory of science.
But van Fraassen also has his sterner moods. In another recent discussion, he in-
vestigates the prospects for a rapprochement between empiricism and neo-Kantianism
(van Fraassen 2009). He identifies as an obstacle to de´tente the fact that each school
sees the other as mired in metaphysics (p. 459)—the empiricist sees the neo-Kantian
as embracing a dependence of reality on the agent, the neo-Kantian sees the empiricist
as naively embracing a species of realism—while itself taking metaphysicians to err not
in espousing false theses, but in failing to espouse any at all (p. 474). In the course
of this discussion, van Fraassen labours mightily to show that the account of scientific
representation that he offers in Parts II and III of SR should not be understood as just
another item on the metaphysicians’ menu, but rather as opting out of the presupposi-
tions that shape the contemporary debate concerning the metaphysical underpinnings
of intentionality (van Fraassen 2009, §§3.4 and 4).
3 Logical Spaces in Scientific Representation
Consider the roles that the notion of a logical space plays in SR.
In Part II of the book, one finds discussions of the problem of coordination (the
process by which the formalism of a theory comes to have empirical content) and of
measurement. The former is a self-conscious continuation of the conventionalist tradi-
tion of Poincare´, Reichenbach, and Gru¨nbaum—although the problem in view is now
taken to be fully general, rather than being limited to the special case of geometry. The
account of measurement harks back to the discussion of logical space in van Fraassen’s
early publications.6 These two discussions are tied together: “The act of measurement
is an act—performed in accordance with certain operational rules—of locating an object
in a logical space” (SR p. 165).
One of the highlights of Part III of SR is a discussion of a paradox of representa-
tion. A distinction is made early on in the book (p. 8) between phenomena (observable
objects, events, and processes) and appearances (contents of observations or measure-
ments). Several varieties of models are also distinguished (pp. 166 f.), including data
models (compendia of appearances), surface models (processed and idealised data mod-
els) and theoretical models (the stock in trade of theories). A central claim of the book
is that science represents phenomena as embeddable in theoretical models (pp. 238
and 247). This leads to a puzzle: while models can be identified with abstract objects,
phenomena cannot be; but an embedding is a function—a map from one set of abstract
objects to another. What sense, then, does it make to speak of phenomena as embed-
dable in a theoretical model? The answer, as I understand it, is a subtle one (see pp.
250–261). Let us suppose that I present a data model or a surface model as an adequate
representation of some phenomena. This act should be thought of as locating myself
in a logical space associated with my measurement concepts. The question whether
the model I have presented is embeddable in a theoretical model associated with some
theory is now a perfectly sensible one. But what about the gap between the concrete
phenomena and the abstract representation of them that I have offered? You can say:
“I see that the phenomena as represented by GB conform to the theory—but I worry
6 See especially (van Fraassen 1967, 1970).
5whether they really do.” But, on van Fraassen’s view, I cannot coherently say that,
anymore than I can coherently say “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining.”
There is much to worry over here. But let us stick to our course, and ask what,
exactly, a logical space is. The notion can be found in many of van Fraassen’s writings.
His favourite illustration is the sort of abstract spaces that are used to represent the
possible colours of things.7 We describe the colour of an object by locating it in such
a space; each colour concept corresponds to a region of the space; and the structure of
the space encodes meaning relations between our colour concepts (everything scarlet
is red but not green etc.). In adopting a given colour space, we are not committing
ourselves to the claim that each of its points corresponds to the colour of an actual
object, but only to the weaker claim each coloured object can be assigned a location
in this space.
In general, a logical space is an abstract space provided by a theory to represent the
range of possible states or characteristics open to the objects described by the theory.8
Typically a logical space will not just be a bare set but will come equipped with some
sort of topological or geometric structure that tells us about relations of proximity or
distance between the states or characteristics allowed by the theory. A region of a logical
space corresponds to a possible property of an object, and the relations of inclusion
between regions encode meaning relations between the corresponding predicates.9
What logical spaces we have available to us depends on what language we work in
and on what theories we accept, and so will change over time (SR, p. 172). No surprise
here: everyone will agree that with the advent of quantum mechanics physicists came
to recognise the possibility of properties and states theretofore undreamt of, and also
to recognise never before noticed relations of incompatibility between certain familiar
properties.
But when combined with certain other themes of SR, this temporal dependence
may seem unsettling. Near the end of his discussion of coordination, van Fraassen
remarks that:
as Mach’s and Poincare´’s analyses show, measurement practice and theory
evolve together in a thoroughly entangled way. Somewhat hesitantly one might
say that the measured parameter [e.g., temperature or time]—or at the very
least its concept—is constituted in the course of this historical development.10
And in his discussion of the paradox of representation van Fraassen seems at times to
be headed towards a view on which, considered in abstraction from our descriptions of
it, the world has no determinate structure. Certainly, van Fraassen argues vigourously
against a popular alternative picture, on which associated with any concrete situation is
a set of distinguished properties and relations, such that a perfectly accurate description
of the situation could (in principle) be given by listing all facts obtaining in it concerning
these distinguished properties and relations. And in the course of this argument he
7 In addition to SR p. 164, see, e.g., (van Fraassen 1967, §4), (van Fraassen 1970, §III.4.b),
and (van Fraassen 1980, §6.5.2).
8 Aside from colour spaces, van Fraassen (SR, p. 164) mentions as examples of logical spaces
“the PVT space in elementary gas theory, phase space in classical mechanics, Hilbert space in
quantum mechanics; space and time themselves . . . .”
9 On this strategy for handling meaning relations, see (van Fraassen 1967), (Stalnaker 1979),
and (Arntzenius 1991).
10 SR, p. 138. Van Fraassen hastens to add that the fact that temperature was constituted
in this sense in the time of Galileo doesn’t prevent us from speaking coherently about facts
concerning temperature at earlier times.
6seems to deny (pp. 243 f.) that it makes sense to speak of the set of parts of an
object in abstraction from our practices of representation; and he seems to assert (pp.
253 f.) that there is a close connection between the observation that any abstract
domain can be equipped with many different relational structures and the thesis that a
phenomenon, considered in itself, doesn’t determine which structures are data models
for it.
Remarks such as these may leave the reader wondering whether van Fraassen is
ready to do more than just flirt with the wilder forms of neo-Kantianism—whether,
for instance he is ready to join Kuhn in speaking of scientists separated by a scientific
revolution as working in different worlds or to embrace Putnam’s slogan that the world
and the mind jointly make up the world and the mind. And, indeed, van Fraassen
speaks not entirely disapprovingly of Kuhn’s way of putting things and with measured
approval of Putnam’s.11
I think it is natural to feel some unease here. What sort of wild picture is being
urged on us by this opponent of speculative metaphysics? But I suspect that van
Fraassen will feel free to dismiss expressions of this unease so long as they are posed
at a sufficiently global level—one of the themes of SR (see, e.g., p. 137) is that one can
fall into incoherence in attempting to adopt a stance that prescinds from too many of
the presuppositions of our ordinary way of thinking of things.
So I will try to express my unease in a more local fashion, focussing on just one
facet of our representation of the world, and discussing cases in which the agents in
question share a great many presuppositions. In the next section, I will argue that in
his early work at least, van Fraassen was committed to each of the following theses.
TI1 Our cognitive situation plays a role in determining the geometric structure of the
world.
TI2 Relative to beings differently situated, our world might have a quite different
geometric structure.
TI3 Considered in abstraction from the cognitive situation of all beings, our world has
no geometric structure.
Let us denote the conjunction of these three theses TI.
4 Time as a Logical Space
Consider the discussion of what time is in §§III.4.b ff. of An Introduction to the Phi-
losophy of Time and Space.12 The point of departure is the contrast between Newton’s
view (time and instants are concrete entities) and Leibniz’s (time is an ideal entity, the
order of non-simultaneous events). A series of modifications and explications of Leib-
niz’s view leads to van Fraassen’s account of time as a logical space.13 “We characterise
the notion of logical space by saying that a logical space is a certain mathematical con-
struct used to represent certain conceptual interconnections” (p. 104). On the view
that van Fraassen extracts from Leibniz and Kant, time is a logical space with the
structure of the real line,
11 For discussion of Kuhn, see SR pp. 144 f. On Putnam’s slogan, see (van Fraassen 2006, p.
125) and (van Fraassen 2009, p. 470 fn. 15).
12 The first edition is (van Fraassen 1970). The second edition, (van Fraassen 1985), is un-
changed except for the addition of a Postscript. All citations in this section are of this work.
Citations by page numbers greater than 199 refer to the Postscript.
13 For corresponding accounts of space and spacetime, see §§IV.3 and VI.6.c.
7used to represent all possible temporal relations among events and the concep-
tual interconnections among these relations. (Thus, simultaneity is represented
by identity of location on the real line, and the fact that temporal precedence
is incompatible with simultaneity is reflected by the incompatibility of < and
=.) (p. 102)
Implicit in the thesis that time qua logical space has a given structure is a commitment
to certain temporal relations holding necessarily. But the notion of necessity involved
is a subtle one because “the possibility that time has a beginning or that time is
topologically closed cannot be ruled out, because . . . physical science might lead to such
a conception of actual world structure” (p. 107). So “the actual temporal structure of
events must necessarily be embeddable in our logical space. But the necessity here
must be construed not as absolute logical necessity but as necessity relativized to the
scientific theories that we accept” (p. 105). Van Fraassen appears willing to accept the
counter-intuitive consequences of this view—e.g., that there is a sense in which there
would be no time if there were no sapient beings (p. 107) and that there is a sense in
which the structure of time may change if our theories change (p. 205).
Does this commit van Fraassen to TI? It looks like it does. Consider a world w
containing agents A and B who agree about what sort of clocks should be used to
measure temporal intervals and who both believe correctly that relative to these clocks,
the total (past and future) temporal extent of matter at their world is a zillion years.
But suppose that A and B disagree as to the structure of time at their world: A takes
this structure to be given by the real line, B takes it to be given be a loop of length two
zillion years. As I understand van Fraassen’s account, we should say that there is no
fact of the matter about who is correct: relative to A’s conceptual scheme, time is open
and infinite; relative to B’s it is closed and finite. Further, I don’t think that we can
say anything much about the structure of time at w in abstraction from the conceptual
scheme of any agent: it would seem that any feature that this structure has would have
to be shared by any space suitable to be the logical space for time for some agent at w;
but in light of van Fraassen’s conventionalism concerning simultaneity (§V.3) as well
as the temporal metric (§III.2), it seems unlikely that there is any such feature, except
perhaps for a lower bound on cardinality. So it looks to me like van Fraassen’s account
of time as a logical space commits him to each of TI1–TI3.
Now I suspect that van Fraassen would resist this characterisation. Already in the
book on philosophy of space and time, there is an emphasis on how things look from
‘inside’ a philosophical view. Consider for instance, a case where we abandon the linear
view of time in favour of the cyclic view of time. Would we then, on van Fraassen’s
view, be committed to the thesis that time had changed its structure? No. For, in such
a case “it is entirely accurate to say at each point in our history: time has such and
such a structure, and that will not change. These assertions will be correct despite
the fact that the structures referred to and the structural characters attributed are
different at different times” (p. 205). In this way, van Fraassen may appear to avoid
commitment to TI1 and TI2. For it seems reasonable to think that if the structure of
time depended on the cognitive situation of agents, then it would change when agents’
cognitive situation changed in a relevant way. But van Fraassen’s point in the passage
just quoted is that from the perspective of agents who have through such cognitive
change, the structure of time is invariant (they say that their earlier views were simply
mistaken).
8But I don’t think that this gets van Fraassen all that he wants. For suppose that I
too am an inhabitant of w and that and that I know that my view coincides either with
the linear view of A or with the cyclic view of B, but I don’t know which (perhaps they
have been presented to me in some simpler form than I am used to and I am unable
to see which corresponds to my own). I see that both views do justice to our shared
principles of coordination and empirical beliefs. What should I say about the structure
of time? It seems that I should say: “One of A or B is correct about the structure of
time and one is wrong—and what determines which is which is which agrees with me
rather than some fact about (the me-independent part of) the world.” In this way, we
recover the dependence of time on cognitive situation, even working within the first
person perspective.
5 Four Questions for van Fraassen
1. What distinguishes those parts of metaphysics that can contribute to understanding
from those parts that are senseless?
2. Does the account of time as a logical space, as originally developed, imply TI? Note
that TI looks like it is a metaphysical thesis, according to the usual standards. (a)
As noted above, Lewis’s account of causation—which is a metaphysical thesis if
anything is—commits him to the causal cousin of TI. (b) Some metaphysicians are
sceptical that the contemporary debate concerning mereology is well-founded.14
Attempts to explicate the sense in which claims about mereology are semantically
defective lead to interesting metaphysical pictures which feature counterparts of
the constituent theses of TI.15
3. Does the account of time as a logical space qualify as metaphysical? There are a
couple of reasons for thinking that it should. (a) As just noted, it appears to imply
the apparently metaphysical thesis TI. (b) The account was originally presented
as arising via modifications of Leibniz’s account, which it is natural to view as
metaphysical since, e.g., it is in competition with Newton’s clearly metaphysical
account. The modifications in question don’t look like it should affect this status.16
And in any case, van Fraassen himself appears to view the logical space account
of space, time, and spacetime as being in competition with the (paradigmatically
metaphysical) absolutist approach.17
4. How, if at all, does the picture of time as a logical space change when located in
the more general account of SR? Do the answers from the previous two questions
carry over?
14 Van Fraassen (2002, §1.5) shares their scepticism.
15 See, e.g., the ontological anti-realism floated in (Chalmers 2009).
16 One of the most important modifications is characterised as being Kantian: namely, the
addition to the account of the claim that time has the same structure in any world. But this
is not the sort of Kantian move that carries us out of the absolute-relational debate. For one
thing, as van Fraassen notes, it is quite plausible that Leibniz himself already accepted the
claim in question (van Fraassen 1985, p. 206).
17 In addition to SR, p. 375 n. 12, see van Fraassen’s (1972, p. 92) and (1985, p. 200).
9References
Arntzenius F (1991) State-spaces and meaning relations among predicates. Topoi
10:35–42
Chalmers D (2009) Ontological anti-realism. In: Chalmers D, Manley D, Wasserman
R (eds) Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford, pp 77–129
Jauernig A (2007) Must empiricism be a stance, and could it be one? How to be
an empiricist and a philosopher at the same time. In: Monton B (ed) Images of
Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 271–318
Langton R (2004) Elusive knowledge of things in themselves. In: Jackson F, Priest G
(eds) Lewisan Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, pp 130–137
Lewis D (1986a) Causation. In: Philosophical Papers, vol II, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, pp 159–213
Lewis D (1986b) Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow. In: Philosophical Pa-
pers, vol II, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 32–66
Lewis D (1986c) A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance. In: Philosophical Papers,
vol II, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 83–132
Lewis D (2009) Ramseyan humility. In: Braddon-Mitchell D, Nola R (eds) Conceptual
Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp 203–222
Stalnaker R (1979) Anti-essentialism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:343–355
van Fraassen B (1967) Meaning relations among predicates. Nouˆs 1:161–179
van Fraassen B (1970) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time and Space, 1st edn.
Random House, New York
van Fraassen B (1972) Earman on the causal theory of time. Synthese 24:87–95
van Fraassen B (1980) The Scientific Image. Oxford University Press, Oxford
van Fraassen B (1985) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time and Space, 2nd edn.
Columbia University Press, New York
van Fraassen B (1989) Laws and Symmetry. Oxford University Press, New York
van Fraassen B (1991) Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View. Oxford University
Press, Oxford
van Fraassen B (2002) The Empirical Stance. Yale University Press, New Haven
van Fraassen B (2006) One hundred and fifty years of philosophy. Topoi 25:123–127
van Fraassen B (2007) From a view of science to a new empiricism. In: Monton B (ed)
Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van
Fraassen, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 337–383
van Fraassen B (2008) Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. Oxford
University Press, Oxford
van Fraassen B (2009) Can empiricism leave realism behind? Toward a dialogue with
transcendentalists. In: Bitbol M, Kerszberg P, Petitot J (eds) Constituting Objec-
tivity: Trascendental Perspectives on Modern Physics, Springer–Verlag, Berlin, pp
459–479
